




































al.，2011；El Ghoul et al.，2013；Devos and Rahman，2014）。研究发现，上市公司与投资者之间
的距离影响上市公司的融资及股利决策（Loughran，2008；John et al.，2011），机构投资者和分
析师以及并购者由于信息优势，对本地公司具有特别偏好（Local Bias）（Coval and Moskowitz，
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1999，2001；Ivkovic and Weisbenner，2005；Kang and
Kim，2008；Malloy，2005；Bebchuk et al.，2009；Alma⁃
zan et al.，2010；Baik et al.，2010），上市公司的公司
治理以及审计质量等会受到公司地理位置的影响






















































































1999；Ivkovic and Weisbenner，2005；Covrig et al.，
2007）。本地信息优势可以促使当地个人及机构投
资者成为更好的监管者（Baik et al.，2010），赚取超
























and Myers，2006；Hutton et al.，2009）。研究发现，会
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其中，被解释变量为 Crashriskt + 1，股价崩盘风
险，由Ncskewt+1、Duvolt+1、Frenquencyt+13个变量衡量；











































表 3列示了所有变量的 Pearson和 Spear⁃
man相关系数。Ncskewt+1与 Duvolt+1的 Pearson
相关系数为 0.960，且显著正相关，说明两者
的一致性较好。TrainPostt与 Crashriskt + 1的 3
Crashriskt+1=α+β1 ×Train+β2 ×TrainPostt
+β3 ×Controlt +∑Year +∑Industry+εt
Crashriskt+1=α+β1 ×Train+β2 ×Chenjit
























































































































































注：上三角形内为 Spearman相关分析结果，下三角形为 Pearson相关分析结果；***，**，*分别表示回归系数在 1%，5%，10%的水平上显著，下同。














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































（9）Almazan，A.，De Motta，A.，Titman，S. and Uysal，V.，
2010，“Financial Structure，Acquisition Opportunities and Firm
Locations”，Journal of Finance，vol.2，pp. 529~563.
（10）Baginski，S. P.，Hassell，J. M. and Kimbrough，M. D.，
2002，“The Effect of Legal Environment on Voluntary Disclo⁃
sure：Evidence from Management Earnings Forecasts Issued in
US and Canadian Markets”，Accounting Review，vol.1，pp. 25~50.
（11）Baik，B.，Kang，J. and Kim，J.，2010，“Local Institution⁃
al Investors，Information Asymmetries and Equity Returns”，Jour⁃
nal of Financial Economics，vol.1，pp. 81~106.
（12）Bebchuk，L.，Cohen，A. and Ferrell，A.，2009，“What
Matters in Corporate Governance?”，Review of Financial Studies，
vol.2，pp. 783~827.
（13）Butler，A. W.，2008，“Distance Still Matters：Evidence
from Municipal Bond Underwriting”，Review of Financial Studies，
vol.2，pp. 763~784.
（14）Callen，J. L. and Fang，X. H.，2013，“Institutional In⁃
vestor Stability and Crash Risk： Monitoring Versus Short-
termism?”，Journal of Banking & Finance，vol.8，pp. 3047~3063.
（15）Cheng，Q.，Du，F.，Wang，X. and Wang，Y.，2016，“See⁃
ing is Believing：Analysts’Corporate Site Visits”，Review of Ac⁃
counting Studies，vol.4，pp. 1245~1286.
（16）Choi，J. H.，Kim，J. B.，Qiu，A. A. and Zang，Y.，2012，
“Geographic Proximity between Auditor and Client：How Does It
Impact Audit Quality?”，Auditing-a Journal of Practice & Theo⁃
ry，vol.2，pp. 43~72.
（17）Coval，J. D. and Moskowitz，T. J.，1999，“Home Bias at
Home：Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios”，Journal
of Finance，vol.6，pp. 2045~2073.
（18）Coval，J. D. and Moskowitz，T. J.，2001，“The Geogra⁃
phy of Investment：Informed Trading And Asset Prices”，Journal
of Political Economy，vol.4，pp. 811~841.
（19）Covrig，V. M.，DeFond，M. L. and Hung，M. Y.，2007，
“Home Bias，Foreign Mutual Fund Holdings and the Voluntary
Adoption of International Accounting Standards”，Journal of Ac⁃
counting Research，vol.1，pp. 41~70.
（20）DeFond，M. L.，Hung，M. Y.，Li，S. Q. and Li，Y. H.，
2015，“Does Mandatory IFRS Adoption Affect Crash Risk?”，The
Accounting Review，vol.1，pp. 265~299.
（21）Devos，E. and Rahman，S.，2014，“Location and Lease
Intensity”，Journal of Corporate Finance，vol.pp. 20~36.
（22）El Ghoul，S.，Guedhami，O.，Ni，Y.，Pittman，J. and Saa⁃
di，S.，2013，“Does Information Asymmetry Matter to Equity Pric⁃
ing? Evidence from Firms' Geographic Location”，Contemporary
Accounting Research，vol.1，pp. 140~181.
（23）Gaspar，J. and Massa，M.，2007，“Local Ownership as
Private Information：Evidence on the Monitoring-liquidity Trade-
off”，Journal of Financial Economics，vol.3，pp. 751~792.
（24）Helwege，J.，Intintoli，V. J. and Zhang，A.，2012，“Vot⁃
ing with Their Feet or Activism? Institutional Investors' Impact
on CEO Turnover”，Journal of Corporate Finance，vol.1，pp. 22~
37.
（25）Hutton，A. P.，Marcus，A. J. and Tehranian，H.，2009，
“Opaque Financial Reports，R-2，and Crash Risk”，Journal of Fi⁃
nancial Economics，vol.1，pp. 67~86.
（26）Ivkovic，Z. and Weisbenner，S.，2005，“Local Does as
Local Is：Information Content of the Geography of Individual In⁃
vestors' Common Stock Investments”，Journal of Finance，vol.1，
pp. 267~306.
（27）Jin，L. and Myers，S. C.，2006，“R- 2 Around the
World：New Theory and New Tests”，Journal of Financial Eco⁃
nomics，vol.2，pp. 257~292.
（28）John，K.，Knyazeva，A. and Knyazeva，D.，2011，“Does
Geography Matter? Firm Location and Corporate Payout Policy”，
Journal of Financial Economics，vol.3，pp. 533~551.
（29）Kang，J. and Kim，J.，2008，“The Geography of Block
Acquisitions”，Journal of Finance，vol.6，pp. 2817~2858.
（30）Kim，J. B. and Zhang，L. D.，2014，“Financial Report⁃
ing Opacity and Expected Crash Risk：Evidence from Implied
Volatility Smirks”，Contemporary Accounting Research，vol.3，pp.
851~875.
（31）Kim，J. B. and Zhang，L.，2016，“Accounting Conserva⁃
tism and Stock Price Crash Risk：Firm-level Evidence”，Contem⁃
porary Accounting Research，vol.1，pp. 412~441.
（32）Kim，J. B.，Li，L. Y.，Lu，L. Y. and Yu，Y. X.，2016，
“Financial Statement Comparability and Expected Crash Risk”，
Journal of Accounting & Economics，vol.2~3，pp. 294~312.
（33）Kim，J. B.，Li，Y. H. and Zhang，L. D.，2011a，“Corpo⁃
rate Tax Avoidance and Stock Price Crash Risk：Firm- level
Analysis”，Journal of Financial Economics，vol.3，pp. 639~662.
（34）Kim，J. B.，Li，Y. H. and Zhang，L. D.，2011b，“CFOs
Versus CEOs：Equity Incentives and Crashes”，Journal of Finan⁃
cial Economics，vol.3，pp. 713~730.
（35）Klein，A. and Zur，E.，2009，“Entrepreneurial Share⁃
holder Activism：Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors”，
Journal of Finance，vol.1，pp. 187~229.
（36）Kothari，S. P.，Shu，S. and Wysocki，P. D.，2009，“Do
Managers Withhold Bad News ?”，Journal of Accounting Re⁃
search，vol.1，pp. 241~276.
（37）Loughran，T.，2008，“The Impact of Firm Location on
Equity Issuance”，Financial Management，vol.1，pp. 1~21.
（38）Loughran，T. and Schultz，P.，2005，“Liquidity：Urban
Versus Rural Firms”，Journal of Financial Economics，vol.2，pp.
341~374.
（39）Malloy，C. J.，2005，“The Geography of Equity Analy⁃
sis”，Journal of Finance，vol.2，pp. 719~755.
（40）Petersen，M. A.，2009，“Estimating Standard Errors in
Finance Panel Data Sets：Comparing Approaches”，The Review
of Financial Studies，vol.1，pp. 435~480.
（41）Piotroski，J. D.，Wong，T. J. and Zhang，T.，2015，“Po⁃
litical Incentives to Suppress Negative Information：Evidence
from Chinese Listed Firms”，Journal of Accounting Research，
vol.2，pp. 405~459.
（42）Skinner，D. J.，1997，“Earnings Disclosures and Stock⁃
holder Lawsuits”，Journal of Accounting & Economics，vol.3，pp.
249~282.
（43）Yu，F. F.，2008，“Analyst Coverage and Earnings Man⁃
agement”，Journal of Financial Economics，vol.2，pp. 245~271.
（44）Yuan，R.，Sun，J. and Cao，F.，2016，“Directors' and Of⁃
ficers' Liability Insurance and Stock Price Crash Risk”，Journal






come migrants' remittance causes a larger effect. Finally, the exclusion of immigration in the urban areas results in
more remittance, then in turn depresses the wage of native workers. The policy implication of this paper is that, the ex⁃
clusion of immigration in turn depresses the wage of native workers in the urban areas, therefore Hukou reforms is a
win-win policy.
An Empirical Study on the Effects of Leadership Non-contingent Punishment
on Employee Organizational Identification
Zhang Zhengtang, Liu Ning and Ding Mingzhi
Punishment is very normal as a management method in organizations. However, there is little empirical research on
this issue. This study aims to explore the leadership non-contingent punishment on employee organizational identifica⁃
tion as well as the mediating role of perceived organizational justice and the moderating role of organizational communi⁃
cation openness. Based on the primary data of a large manufacturing company, this study finds out that the leadership
non-contingent punishment has a significant negative effect on the employees' organizational identification. The per⁃
ceived organizational justice mediates the relationship. The moderating role of organizational communication openness
on the relationship of leadership non-contingent punishment and perceived organizational justice is not supported. How⁃
ever, it negatively moderates the relationship between perceived organizational justice and organizational identification.
The results show that the organizational communication openness moderates the mediating role of perceived organiza⁃
tional justice. At the end of this paper, we discuss the results and put forward the implications for the management
practice as well as for the future research.
China High-Speed Railways and Stock Price Crash Risk
Zhao Jing, Huang Jingchang and Liu Feng
Using the opening of China high-speed railways (CHR) as an exogenous shock to measure the sudden decrease of
information asymmetry and monitoring cost, this study tries to investigate the impact of CHR opening on stock price
crash risk. The results show that the operation of CHR can reduce stock price crash risk and this relation is more sig⁃
nificant for firm-years only with non-intercity lines and for firm-years with both intercity and non-intercity lines. Fur⁃
ther analysis finds that the negative relation between the opening of CHR and stock price crash risk is more significant
at high information asymmetry and low monitoring environment. The findings of this paper demonstrate that the opening
of CHR can increase information transparency and improve corporate governance, which provides empirical evidence of
the impact of transportation infrastructure on the financial market environment.
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